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Available online 21 November 2020AbstractThis study proposes climate security: a research agenda proposal with certain research significance. It acknowledges the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as current
institutional case studies (and key actors) for international climate politics. It answers the question of the extent to which climate security
scholars have mapped the field with respect to these three institutions. To do this, it reviews relevant literature of climate security and concisely
summarizes the literature views. Although climate security scholars have studied how these specialist institutions have understood global climate
governance, a comparative coverage of how the institutions have conceptualized climate security is missing in existing literature. The key finding
shows the concepts of epistemic communities, climate securitization and climate-riskifications as appropriate analytical themes for interpreting
the emerging norm of climate security. Arguing that conceptual development persists even though the institutions original mandates did not
require such conceptualization, the study uses discourse analysis of relevant literature on climate security to orient future research on climate
change and climate security given the knowledge that speech-acts on climate security (henceforth speech-acts) now seem like potential policy
consideration in the foreseeable future.
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When one talks about climate security in the context of a
distinctly emerged field of research, two key concepts deserve
close attention: securitization and norm development.
Research have explored climate security within this context
but there is no study comparing how the United Nations
Framework on Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), the
European Union (EU) and the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) have conceptualized climate security (for
instance, Trombetta, 2012; Hsiang and Burke, 2013; Ewing,
2014; Diez et al., 2016; Dellmuth et al., 2018; Dupont,
2019). In addition to correcting this imbalance soon, thisE-mail address: christcyber@yahoo.co.uk.
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effectively examine in comparing and interpreting the extent
to which speech-acts by interstate institutions could indicate
an emerging new norm around the concept of climate security.
These themes are epistemic communities, climate securitiza-
tion and climate-riskifications.
Securitization could be defined either as a sequence of
events involving a securitizing actor, a securitizing move,
audience and policy action or the outcome of a shared threat
perception across states, followed by agreement on appro-
priate policy response (Sperling and Weber, 2017, 2019;
Floyd, 2019a). Corry (2012) defines riskification based on a
re-theorization of what distinguishes risks from threats; that
is, risk politics is not a situation of securitization, but
something distinct with its own advantages and dangers.
According to Corry (2012), threat-based security deals with
direct causes of harm, whereas risk-security is orienteddministration). Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi.
ommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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harm a kind of second-order security politics that promotes
long-term precautionary governance. With climate securiti-
zation, various commentators have warned that the successful
securitization of climate change could become a harbinger of
drastic, undemocratic and extraordinary measures in a high-
politics setting (Oels, 2012). With climate-riskification, an
epistemic community, a network of specialized experts who
assist political figures on difficult policy issues, plays a
crucial role by presenting the risks of climate change as a
policy issue that is best pursued as a sustainable development
agenda. With this knowledge, applying the themes to analysis
of institutional responses or speech-acts on climate security
should clarify the mystery surrounding the exact responses
and actions undertaken at the interstate institutional level.
Due to active involvement in the ongoing climate security
debate, the UNFCCC, the EU, and the UNSC are perhaps the
best-case studies. These institutions are enormously influen-
tial when it comes to where this debate may be heading next
or, to be more precise, the normative trajectory of climate
security.
The concept of climate security is largely unquestionable. It
seeks to respond to the security implications of climate change
in terms of a series of threats associated with climate change;
disasters feature prominently among these threats, but other
concerns identified included the destabilising effects of
regional population movements and even future conflict over
commons resources (McDonald, 2020). For McDonald,
acknowledging these implications implies strategic prepared-
ness and planning to manage the effects of a warmer world e
including in the form of humanitarian assistance, disaster re-
lief. Clearly, climate security envisions working with policy
planners and decision-makers to design pragmatic responses to
confront climate security risks and propel community level
initiatives where it is perhaps most needed.
In recent times it is rapidly becoming a practice among
climate security scholars to offer systematic review of the
expansive literature on this topic. Such approach is welcomed,
including constructive critiques. For instance, Nishimura
(2017) argues that the UNFCCC provide little guidance to
the meaning of some adaptation obligations. Nishimura's
argument parallels both Conca's (2015) opinion regarding the
UN's skewed approach to environmental action and Pettenger
(2017) position about the UN's erratic efforts when it comes to
collective reply to climate challenges. One reason for these
scholars' arguments could be due to very different un-
derstandings and thus conceptualizations of the ways in which
the effects of climate change affect human well-being. Despite
their merits, however, these arguments are not helping much
when it comes to moving the contentious climate security
debate forward.
Climate security is indeed an emerging field of research
(see, for example, Oels, 2012). Credible challenges and rec-
onceptualizations of climate security foundations can be found
in Ewing (2014). These could be due to several reasons. A
case in point is Vivekananda (2018) on climate change, con-
flict and crisis in Lake Chad. While there is yet no analysis orprocess which explicitly considers the role climate change
plays in either risk or the shaping of appropriate responses,
despite the significant role climate change plays in shaping the
risk landscape (Vivekananda, 2018).
Key among those reasons is, on the one hand, the need for
comparative-based understanding of climate security chal-
lenges, especially with respect to securitization. It is also crucial
to understand how the UNFCCC, the EU, and the UNSC might
best respond considering that the role of climate change as a
threat multiplier is a clear basis for the climate security cause. A
scan of speech-acts by these institutions revealed an interesting
finding: the concepts of climate conflict and threat multiplier
are unfolding as critical elements of institutional debates held
by these institutions. To understand how the institutions have
understood these two concepts and therefore climate security
challenges, comparing speech-acts by the three institutions is
vital if one is to capture how they have conceptualized climate
security. The exercise should be complemented by responses
from expert interviewees without forgetting to ask the experts
for clarifications on key contexts that would assist proper
contextualization of the main narrative with fresh evidence on
and insights into, for instance, whether or not securitization has
happened or is happening or may happen on the ground,
including the extent of securitization e assuming this is the true
picture. This approach would enhance understanding about the
climate actions that have been undertaken and what has yet to
be achieved (see Oels, 2012; Ewing, 2014; Dellmuth et al.,
2018; Bremberg et al., 2019).
On the other, a comparative approach with respect to norm
development will help to move beyond the bewildered situa-
tion over the climate security question. Goldstein (2016)
seems useful in this regard. Covering a broad range of topics
that push the traditional boundaries of international security
studies, Goldstein (2016) presents some ideas on the linkages
between international security and global warming partly
because research on climate politics, as Keohane (2016) ar-
gues, is urgently needed although a focus on the normative
dimensions of climate policy may distract attention from
addressing critical climate challenges. While such ideas
discursively constitute a discussion of the connections be-
tween norms research and climate politicization discourse,
Klinsky et al. (2017) believe that, on the one hand, it is crucial
to address Keohane's contention because it appeared to fit
within an established line of contention that has been made by
influential actors in both UN negotiations and the academic
sphere. On the other, academics cannot leave the normative
dimensions out of their analysis nor avoid it as an explicit
research topic because it is yet to be fully understand what
drives climate action and inaction.
Furthermore, Mitchell and Carpenter (2019) assert that
climate change scholars could fruitfully focus greater attention
on political efforts promoting strong global ethical norms for
climate action because a norms-based discourse may spear-
head faster, more effective climate action. In corollary, while
managing climate change-related risks is a key task of national
governments, the mismatch e arising partly from conflicts of
interest between and within countries e between the severity
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initiatives means that dealing effectively with these risks re-
quires the mainstreaming of climate risks into foreign and
security policy possible, including an in-depth understanding
of associated dynamics (Frick and Schulz, 2014). Indeed, ar-
gues Carlane (2010):
Despite transatlantic convergence around questions of
climate security, outstanding questions remain over the
security dimensions of climate change in terms of what is
being secured, what is being secured against, who is
responsible for providing security, whose security is of
most concern, when security-based measures are justified,
and at what cost (Dabelko and Simmons, 1997). These
questions could ultimately divide the transatlantic debate.
Considering the discussion so far, climate security scholars
have examined how the UNFCCC, the EU, and the UNSC
have understood global climate governance; however, a
comparative coverage of how these institutions have concep-
tualized climate security is missing in existing literature. The
present study therefore contributes by considering an impor-
tant question: to what extent has climate security scholars
mapped the field? This is an issue for how climate security has
been understood, conceptualised and analysed. Not only is the
question unalterably one of the ways forward but particularly a
securitization as well as normative exercise. The study thus
innovatively contributes to research on climate security by
justifying a research agenda regarding the extent to which
speech-acts by interstate institutions (the UNFCCC, the EU,
and the UNSC e suggested case studies) could indicate an
emerging new norm around the concept of climate security. It
argues that conceptual development is ongoing when it comes
to both the threat multiplier context of climate change and the
possibility of climate conflict, although these institutions
original mandates did not require such conceptualization.
This study is organized as follows in order to properly situate
it within the existing body of climate security research. Having
presented the overall goal as an unknown knowledge requiring
clear answers, it discusses the inclusion/exclusion categories for
conceptualization of extant literature. Next, it justifies the
suitability of three institutional case studies and highlights the
key gaps in climate security literature. By conceptualizing key
concepts, it situates this justification within existing literature in
order to further prove the relevance of these cases. The overall
goal is then concisely rephrased into two open questions, fol-
lowed by an outline of specific objectives and how these may be
operationalized such that these questions will be clearly
answered as contributions to knowledge. The study then sug-
gests avenues for further research.
2. Method and data2.1. Informing the study: inclusion and/or exclusion
categoriesThis study is based on discourse analysis method. It spe-
cifically focuses on the literature strand that has examinedclimate security, especially in terms of the UNFCCC, the EU,
and the UNSC. In this light, each location in Table 1 is a
representative snapshot of definitions of key concepts in the
literature on climate security. At all these locations, framing
functions in a similar manner for setting an agenda, defining
the associated problems, diagnosing causes, suggesting ethical
judgements, and promoting particular remedial actions in real-
time context. These functions signify the conceptualization of
key frames. Within this context, one assertion cannot be de-
nied. It is possible to posit a major step forward in measurable
conceptualizations of performance in addressing climate se-
curity challenges (Dellmuth et al., 2018) across three framings
that stand out in Table 1 namely epistemic community, secu-
ritization and climate-riskification. What is striking about this
assertion and these framings and, by extension, the rhetorical
struggle of what gets included and excluded, is what could
strip away the power of a frame. For instance, the concept of
climate-riskification can imply what scientists say or a
consensus among decision-makers, meaning either of these
two concepts could be a frame shift to appropriate what can be
deemed as frames or frameable as opposed to what is actually
framed. To capture the three framings and thus analytical
themes, a literature review of peer-reviewed definitions was
collected. Whether based on a qualitative or quantitative study,
the selected definition is underpinned by most commonly or
oft-cited frames. Since scholarly definitions almost always
feed into, directly or indirectly, the expansive social-security-
political narratives or themes, the selection of frames is guided
by studies with a distinctive bent towards this study's sense of
climate security and climate securitization. The latter's pro-
cesses can be categorised into three framings namely policy
setting, securitizing actors and securitizing moves such as
statements and image repertoires (Balzacq, 2011). These
framings are well suited for structuring an analysis of climate
change (Paglia, 2018) and climate security. Therefore, before
being applied to specific case studies, researchers might want
to reconceptualize the three framings as analytical themes
from the literature, in addition to robust discussion of relevant
contexts.
Researchers should note that the concept of epistemic
communities is perhaps best reconceptualized as the epistemic
community on climate security; securitization could be rec-
onceptualized as climate securitization e the process in which
statements successfully convinced relevant audience about the
vulnerability of named referent objects and thus influenced the
politics of climate security. The ongoing debate over whether
climate change has been securitized heralded the threat-based
climate securitization focussing on impacts, symptoms,
imposition of rules, international order and self-directed pro-
tection like fortifying borders to keep climate migrants out. It
is in this context that Corry (2012) introduced riskification to
climate change research mainly because the politics of crafting
something as a risk is clearly a social process that is different
from securitization theory. The logic of security risk focuses
on the conditions of possibility or constitutive causes of harm,
whereas the logic of security threat focuses on direct causes of
harm (Corry 2012). It then becomes reasonable that the risk-
Table 1
Conceptualizations of key terminologies (CC ¼ Climate Change).
Literature Concept Definition Framing Reference
This study Security Comprises the ability of individuals to thrive
in an environment free from climate threats
Freedom to choose and act Human well-being
IPCC (2014) Human
security
Condition that protects human lives
O'Brien and Barnett
(2013)
Focuses on individual, group, environment Freedom to choose and act CC/Complex challenges




Securitization Shifting from normal politics to emergency
politics; naming an existential threat to a
referent object
Securitizing actors, referent objects, and
relevant audience
Extraordinary measure
Stritzel (2007) Security A single security speech at a point in time Securitization Referent objects
Harris (2019) Social commitment with a clear
communicative intention (e.g. treaties,
constitutive norms)




















Risk/Threat-free habitable environment Climate fragility and civil conflict Environment/human
well-being
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securitization but differs in key respects with the focus on
causes, side effects, reflexivity and influencing the way we
operate e emission reduction for instance. Up to now there is
a scarcity of literature separating climate securitization from
climate-riskification and applying these in analysis of climate
security. This is an opportunity for researchers to progress
knowledge. Note that a distinction between securitization and
riskification is particularly applicable when the relevant
audience (e.g., epistemic communities) demonstrates accep-
tance through recursive application which in turn rests upon
absence of barrier to such application.
Partly because the suggested themes have specific mean-
ings and perform different functions in the climate security
debate and because the debate is not happening in a vacuum, a
key task for researchers is to determine how far the themes
have emerged within the institutional cases. Integral elements
such as institutional and other actors who are involved in and
behind the debate ought to be foregrounded. Although these
actors are spread across the globe, they collaborate on and
coordinate the debate to the extent that the appropriate fitting
label is an epistemic community. The problem is that the
literature has tended to focus on the EU epistemic community
at the expense of other influential actors whose voices cannot
be discounted in the debate. An epistemic community denotes
professional networks where topic experts with authoritative
and policy-relevant expertise use their knowledge to influence
policymakers’ decisions on what constitutes a problem, such
as framing policy issues as requiring management by
extraordinary measures (Cross, 2013; Jerden, 2017).3. Case study and key gaps in research
In today's world affairs, there exists a perfect problematic
trifecta: the natural environment, the socio-economic system
and climatic security challenges are intertwined and display-
ing politically anomaly outlook, awing even the most seasoned
political forecasters. While the environment has for a long
time been a silent victim of civil conflict. Persistent disregard
for both humanitarian principles and the Geneva Conventions'
rules of warfare extends callously to internal displacement,
human well-being and the environment, to name but a few
(e.g., State of Kuwait, 2018). All these reasons, on the one
hand, exist despite a resolution on observance of the interna-
tional day for preventing the exploitation of the environment
in war and armed conflict which the UN General Assembly
adopted in 2001. On the other, the reasons began to signify the
relevance of the three institutional case studies with respect to
climate security.
Climate security is an important and current research
agenda, especially in terms of the UNFCCC, the EU, and the
UNSC. For instance, within the context of the examination of
resilience discourses in terms of their basic discursive struc-
ture and extent of institutionalization to determine how
dominant climate security narratives articulate understandings
of security and insecurity in contemporary international
environmental politics (Ferguson, 2019), several international
organizations are now seeking to respond to climate-related
security risks (Bremberg et al., 2019). In mid-2018 the EU
organized a high-level diplomatic meeting, which not only
underscored various ways that climate change was multiplying
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sponsibility to prepare for security impacts and urged for
elevating the climate-security nexus to the highest political
level in (inter)national forums (Conca, 2019). Furthermore,
Biedenkopf and Petri (2019) rely on interview data in order to
provide the first expansive mapping of EU climate diplomacy
practices of EU Delegations and interpret the surprising vari-
ance therein.
To continue justifying the case studies within the context of
that trifecta, this study accepts not only the relevance of the
climate and security topic in global climate debates
(Meierding, 2013) but also rising concerns about climatic
consequences e which could lead to climate conflict. This
possibility parallels the growing climate-conflict literature
(Pearson and Newman, 2019), which has been acknowledged
by the IPCC. Several scholars have argued the questions of
behavioral change induced by institutional responses to
inherent challenges of climate security. In this regard, inter-
state institution performance may be best assessed through
comparisons of accomplishments within and across in-
stitutions (Tallberg et al., 2016). Indeed, future studies might
usefully explore the relative power of such factors in
explaining effective interstate institution responses to climate
security challenges and thereby contribute to both the
emerging field and the broader literatures on climate security
(Dellmuth et al., 2018). According to Dellmuth (2019), an
interstate institution's legitimacy is consequential for its
effectiveness in promoting climate security. For deeper un-
derstanding about how performance influences interstate in-
stitutions' legitimacy (Tallberg et al., 2016), more research is
needed on the legitimacy e the beliefs among the subjects of a
political institution that the institution's authority is appropri-
ately exercised e of interstate institutions addressing climate
risks (Dellmuth, 2019). To further demonstrate the relevance
of institutional case studies, the EU and the UNSC have both
recognized climate change as a significant factor in propelling
conflict and security dynamics across the Sahel e for instance
(Kalkavan, 2019) while a review of the research agenda on
interstate institutions and climate security suggests how to
meaningfully link this agenda to broader lines of theory on
institutional change and effectiveness (Dellmuth et al., 2018).
By considering a question regarding the extent to which
speech-acts by the UNFCCC could indicate an emerging new
norm around climate security, future research should examine
the Task Force on Displacement because it is the right thing to
do for two important reasons. Firstly, this question allows the
proposed research agenda to make original contribution to the
unfolding institutional dialogue in the context of the Warsaw
Mechanism e custodian of the Task Force on Displacement.
And secondly, this question, bearing in mind the critical
research challenging certain assumptions behind institution-
alized relation occurring within the UNFCCC (Baldwin et al.,
2019), is further attestation to engagement with the emerging
reality of climate security. This phenomenon further attests to
the timeliness of the proposed research agenda's goal.
Achieving this goal rests on scrutinizing speech-acts on
climate security which would be made possible by narrowingthe agenda's scope to the contributions of specialist in-
stitutions: the UNFCCC, the EU, and the UNSC.
Clearly, these specialist institutions, beyond their qualifi-
cations as suitable case studies, are endowed with evidence
regarding how institutional actors have sought to understand
and conceptualize climate security. This fact including the
need for more systematic comparative analysis of speech-acts
on climate security by these current cases is largely respon-
sible for identification of these case studies. On the one hand,
these cases remain central to setting rules and norms govern-
ing global climate change. On the other and just as important:
i) there is opportunity to access online evidence on speech acts
on climate security covering the 2001e2019 analytical time-
frame, ii) there is adequate evidence of institutional level
meetings and technical reports on these meetings with respect
to securitizing moves on climate security, and iii) comparative
analysis is possible because speech-acts can be evaluated
using the three analytical themes (mentioned in previous
pages) on a fairly equal basis.
It is worth mentioning that comparative analysis by Diez
et al. (2016) standout with respect to one major attempt to
securitize climate change. This particular comparative anal-
ysis regarding the efforts of the British Embassy in Mexico
City together with British think tank Royal United Services
Institute, the world's oldest security policy-oriented think tank
(von Lucke, 2015), stand out neither because of its focus on
divergent climate security discourses. Nor because it shows
the EU's influence e in the absence of an effective securiti-
zation e in enforcing climate policies in Turkey in compari-
son to unsuccessful securitization efforts in Mexico by the
British actors. National level analysis by Diez et al. (2016)
stand out mainly because it did not evade clarifying the sus-
ceptibility of comparative approach to risk of methodological
nationalism given that climate negotiations and debates are
propelled forward by transnational experts, actors who form
part of an epistemic community. By pinpointing this potential
pitfall as well as analysing whether these actors are successful
or not, Diez et al. (2016) protect their key arguments from
criticisms.
Although the present study focuses on the international
level, it still benefited from the comparative national level
analysis by Diez et al. (2016). This is not to say that using the
national level as analytical unit is unproblematic. For instance,
analysing climate securitization at the national level is prob-
lematic because climatological conditions can vary widely
within a country as one region may experience normal con-
ditions while another suffers from a severe drought. In this
regard, many researchers have been responsive. They have
changed the scale of their analyses into small grids to reduce
collection of erroneous data (Meierding, 2016), and not
because policymakers seem convinced that, at the very least,
climate change will exacerbate groups’ tendencies toward
violence (Meierding, 2013).
As shown in Table 2, interstate institutions play significant
roles when it comes to climate and security dynamics, sug-
gesting the worthiness of institutional case studies for
comparative examination of speech-acts on climate security.
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of performance in addressing climate security challenges
(Dellmuth et al., 2018), Table 2 also shows that three analyt-
ical themes namely epistemic communities climate securiti-
zation, and climate-riskification are implicitly, explicitly
aligned (as applicable) to the institutional case studies.
Furthermore, Dellmuth et al. (2018) seek to advance the
research agenda on interstate institutions and climate security
through a systematic review of the literature. They suggest
how to meaningfully link this agenda to broader lines of the-
ory on institutional change and effectiveness in international
politics. Reason been that scholars investigating related topics
are usually unmotivated by shared conceptualizations though
they offer in-depth knowledge about particular cases of indi-
vidual interstate institutions in specific policy areas (Dellmuth
et al., 2017). Agreeing with these scholars, this state of the art
reflects the fragmented nature of global climate governance
where climate security challenges typically fit uncomfortably
within interstate institutions' mandates. Agreeing with these
authors, a better understanding of climate security challenges
would facilitate crafting effective global solutions to society's
most intractable climate security challenges. Perhaps more
importantly, future research should, methodologically, think
conditionally about both institutional change and advancing
existing inductive case study research with theory-driven
comparative research (Dellmuth et al., 2018). Furthermore,
what remains to be made available to the climate security
research community includes more systematic comparative
analysis of effectiveness within and between organs of inter-
state institutions (Dellmuth et al., 2017; Hardt, 2017).Table 2
Sample of research on climate security and institutional case studies, 2007e2019
Literature Institution Key context
Sindico (2007) UNSC Climate change
Evans (2008) IPCC, UNSC, EU Climate change
Detraz and Betsill (2009) UNSC 2007 UNSC de
Conway (2010) UNSC UNSC's role
Zwolski and Kaunert (2011) EU Epistemic com
Depledge and Feakin (2012) UN, NATO, EU International se
Kurtz (2012) UN Securitization
Cousins (2013) UNSC UNSC's role
Sonnsj€o and Bremberg (2016) EU Policymaking
Hardt (2017) Institutional actors Need for more
Dellmuth et al. (2017) E.g. UNSC, NATO, EU Summary of th
systematic revi
institutions
Dellmuth et al. (2017) UNSC, NATO, EU Most evidence
Bremberg (2018) OSCE, NATO, EU Actors with a s




Biedenkopf and Petri (2019) EU Climate diplom
Bremberg et al. (2019) Theory-practice
Dupont (2019) Collective secu
Chin-Yee (2019) UNFCCC Heart of global
Calliari et al. (2019) Politics of loss
Baldwin et al. (2019) Institutionalize
relationship
Conca (2019) UNSC UNSC's roleThe present study embraces these empirical findings
because we cannot and should not deny a number of facts.
Firstly, several scholars only conducted a systematic review of
existing literature. Secondly, Table 2 shows that scholars, as
part of efforts to progress the ongoing climate security debate,
have overwhelmingly focused on the EU and the UNSC, and
rightly so. And thirdly, less are those who compared the EU
and the UNSC with respect to a focus on speech-acts on
climate security; and even at that, however such comparison is
articulated, it may not be so right due to the unacceptable level
of engagement with the UNFCCC considering the widespread
recognition of the UNFCCC as the legitimate platform to air
and progress matters of climate and security. This meant no-
body has systematically compared the UNFCCC, the EU, and
the UNSC in terms of speech-acts on climate security.
It is therefore unsurprising that Boston et al. (2009) recount
why an edited collection challenged scholars for convincing
analysis on the relationship between climatic consequences
and instability as well as policy responses to these conse-
quences. van der Geest and Warner (2015) have in/directly
responded to that challenge. These authors present a collection
of manuscripts from an international conference held in
February 2013 at the UN University Institute for Environment
and Human Security in Bonn. Whereas the conference focused
on decision-making on loss and damage, other scholars
adopted a slightly different approach by considering the extent
to which there is an academic discourse aiming at analysing
the relationship between climate change and maritime security
(see Germond and Mazaris, 2019; Germond and Wa Ha,
2019). Baldwin et al. (2019) also belong to that group oftimeframe.
Key word
at the UNSC Climate and security
gained renewed prominence Speech-acts by these actors
bate Security dimensions of climate change
Climate and security
munities Climate security agenda





e key findings of the first
ew of research on interstate
Climate security
points to these cases Trends of climate security discourse
ecurity mandate Climate-related security risks
nce comes mostly from these Climate security research community
acy International actor
gap Climate security policy
ritization Climate security
climate governance Setting of rules/standards
/damage mechanism Loss/Damage
d climate-human mobility Emerging research agenda
Climate security
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mentioned challenge. Baldwin et al. (2019) label policy re-
sponses to climate consequences as a matter of priority
requiring rigorous explanations mainly because this priority is
an unfolding research agenda. Without alluding to neither
climate security nor climate securitization, Baldwin et al.
(2019) contend that the unfolding agenda challenges certain
assumptions underpinning the growing institutionalised
response occurring within the UNFCCC.
4. Discussion4.1. Conceptualizing key conceptsConceptual and definitional challenges should be addressed
early because this exercise not only prevents a presumption
that readers would be familiar with key concepts and the
study's understanding thereof (see Table 1). Rather, the basic
premise for conceptualizations also enables important contexts
for the study's overall analytical thrust and interpretations. Just
as global environmental security and politics research has
established its own concepts, now seen as more useful for
interpreting the shifting world affairs (Zurn, 1998), one
meaningful way climate security scholars have sought to un-
pack and better comprehend the climate dilemma is to set up
working conceptualizations. Whilst it would be redundant to
explain why existing conceptualizations are constructed the
way they are, and not another, as such exercise will take this
study beyond its intended purposes, the study, beyond com-
plementing the utility of some existing conceptualizations
through contextualization in ways that have not been explicitly
presented before such that meaningful conversation with
practitioners is enabled, offers new conceptualizations for
certain key concepts upon first mention and used consistently
thereafter.
Set against the construct in Table 1, the conceptualization
of security is specifically articulated to help with conceptual-
ization of analytical themes which in turn should facilitate
deeper analysis in terms of the case studies, but that of climate
conflict needs a repair. This study redefines climate conflict as
the conflict dimension of climate-related displacement
whereby climate change is perceived as a threat multiplier that
exacerbates already existing challenges with respect to
climate-related displacement. As for climate security, the
conceptual contest is unsettled (Youngs, 2015). Prominent
among existing articulations is the European EU (2016)
construct: climate change and environmental degradation
exacerbate potential conflict. In parallel, the UN defined
climate security as a minimizer of climate-related risks to
human security. Also, climate security refers to either the
absence of climate threats to individuals, communities,
countries and the international system or the condition where
these referent objects have the ability to manage stressors and
prevent climate-related risks (Thomas, 2017; Dellmuth et al.,
2017). Compared to the latter two conceptualizations that
broadly named the threats and clearly identified the referentobjects, the EU's conceptualization also broadly identified the
threat (climate change, environmental degradation and con-
flict) but without specific referent objects.
As none of the conceptualizations for climate security is
inclusive enough, this study offers a new version that is narrow
and more inclusive: climate security is the recognition of
several ways in which climate change is implicated as a threat
multiplier to international security, human security, climate
induced displacement and conflict prevention strategies. This
conceptualization may not be absolutely-inclusive but narrow
enough for retrieval and interpretation of statements invoking
security framings e perhaps the most singularly salient factor
underpinning whether specific framings will be strongly con-
tested or not. This is vital for deciphering the extent to which
statements by the three institutional case studies have framed
climate change as a security problem and thus the indication of
an emerging norm on climate security.
Table 1 outlines the definitions for key concepts that have
been mentioned so far: climate security, security, human se-
curity, climate change and environmental security. The defi-
nitions of either risk or security presupposed the
corresponding framing in such a way that facilitates theme
emergence with direct relevance for the research questions and
thus credible analysis of case studies. Framing is quite
insightful because it can be used on the one hand as a theory to
systematically unpack new perspectives and angles, to more
clearly understand the relationships between events, to make
informed interventions and on the other as a technique for
interpreting textual statements. Framing, as a technique, is of
more significance in this study because it anticipates norma-
tive efforts underpinning the three analytical themes. Set
against the construct in Table 1, a frame obviously reduces the
number of possible or endless interpretations but framing
which oftentimes capture categories of themes can be simul-
taneously undermined by the discourse of the context or theme
of conversation.4.2. Open questions for future researchA review of the literature revealed a useful detail. The well-
established climate-security link (Diez et al., 2016) remains
hotly, emotively and deeply contested. That was when several
questions began to emerge, underpinned by this study's
intention to understand climate security discourses in the
pursuit of suggesting a research agenda for future studies as
well as progressing the climate security debate. When this is
taken together with analytical themes that must be conceptu-
alized from existing climate security literature, scholars might
want to consider two crucial questions: to what extent could
climate security-related speech-acts by institutional case
studies indicate an emerging new norm around climate secu-
rity? Is climate change changing the perceptions and con-
ceptions of security within the institutional case studies and, if
so, to what extent? On the one hand, these questions are
sensitive markers for indicating knowledge gaps and should be
aligned with von Lucke's (2014) concise articulation:
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various climate security discourses in terms of their policy
consequences and to strengthen the empirically based
comparative agenda. We also need to pay more attention to
how some discourses have come to prevail over others in
the struggle for the representation of climate change, in
whose name they are invoked, and how they reconfigure the
political debate on climate change and beyond.
On the other, answers to the questions should enable a
deeper understanding of the numerous contextualizations and
conceptualizations of climate security in extant discourses.
Beyond helping to fill a missing coverage by providing vital
insights into where the climate security debate may be head-
ing, such answers should also clarify the mystery surrounding
the normative trajectory of climate security.4.3. Specific objectivesThere are at least five specific steps that should be under-
taken for future research to meaningfully achieve the goal
started here. These objectives include i) conceptualization of
key terminologies, ii) conceptualization of climate security
discourses and construction of distinct analytical themes, iii)
interviews with climate/security policy experts, iv) meticulous
application of analytical themes to each case study in order to
capture climate security framings and operation at the level of
norm entrepreneurs, and v) comparison and interpretation of
findings that were uncovered during examination of each case
study.
The first objective is conceptualization. Given that certain
critical concepts will so prominently be mentioned at one point
or the other, it is important to define, in more detail, the ways
these concepts will be utilized. The second objective is
conceptualization of climate security discourses. This is
required for constructing distinct analytical themes at the same
level of abstraction such that these themes will not only
advance climate security discourses with solid evidence but also
facilitate clearer interpretations of the relevance of speech-acts
for the climate security debate and therefore climate policy-
making. More robust conceptualization of climate security
discourses will also enhance our understandings of what we are
being told by these discourses and, in effect, the ways in which
they have evolved over time. In this study, the climate security
debate refers to high-level political deliberations on climate and
security. It also refers to how scholars have discussed possible
relationship between the negative impacts of climate change
and international security e which includes human security.
There is high likelihood that construction of analytical themes
will uncover a need for certain category of data which should
lead to the third objective: informal interviews with climate/
security policy experts. To perform the fourth objective, re-
searchers should apply that set of analytical themes to each case
study. Tying all these objectives together, the fifth and final
objective should compare and interpret findings that were un-
covered during application of analytical themes to each insti-
tutional case study.To do so, researchers should ponder the following details.
Climate change may become an indirect driver of social
instability in developing countries (Schilling et al., 2020),
struggling to compete in a world that has reached an inter-
dependent interactive level to such extent it has been
acknowledged to great effect, making it all too clear how
climate hazards have become globalized (Femia et al., 2014).
Territories with societal problems such as high levels of
militarization, insurgencies, and increased displacement of
human population convey a broad array of main conditions
that shape the climate conflict dimensions of vulnerability
(Verhoeven, 2014). In the contemporary world in which power
is concentrated at the international level, dominated by rich
industrialised countries, another name for such territories is
peripheral countries where climatic impacts like extreme
drought may bring consequences for the economies of indus-
trialised countries thousands of kilometres away. While with
this knowledge we must not ignore the role of political power
which remains an influential factor of political stability glob-
ally, some impacts of climate change may indirectly lead to
violence. Since the likelihood of political and civil violence is
greater in peripheral countries than industrialised countries,
the same can be said about political instability which may
result from, among others, the onset of climate conflict.
However, the favourable conditions for climate conflict
onset, if it happens, are more likely to be found at the national
level especially in peripheral countries. Furthermore, with
resource conflict being increasingly acknowledged as a key
substantive outcome of climate variability and change, un-
derstanding the underlying drivers that shape the framework of
differential vulnerabilities in areas that are double exposed to
climate and conflict has great significance (Okpara et al.,
2017). Researchers might want to consider this framework
for two key reasons. First, the framework is rarely applied in
climate conflict studies at household and community levels
(Okpara et al., 2017). Second, despite that policymakers seem
convinced that climate change will exacerbate groups’ ten-
dencies toward violence, climate-conflict researchers have
failed to discover consistent linkages between environmental
shifts and intrastate contention (Meierding, 2013). However, it
is worth mentioning that analysing climate conflicts at the
national level is problematic because climatological conditions
can vary widely within a country as a region may experience
normal conditions while another suffers from a severe drought.
Researchers have been responsive in this regard. They have
changed the scale of analyses into small grids because such
spatial degradation reduces the possibility of collecting erro-
neous data on climate conflict (Meierding, 2016).
With respect to climate conflict, climate change is altering
the geopolitical resource landscape as manifested by increased
competition over disputes over maritime boundaries and
Arctic resources. Indeed, preventing catastrophic climate
change is actually a resource challenge that will lead to dra-
matic know-how competition in energy, water, and maritime
resources e such as in the South China Sea and the Arctic
region. As the impacts on the societal security of Indigenous
peoples is gaining attention (for instance, Hossain, 2016;
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has been primarily explored in terms of economic and national
interests. Interests in the geostrategic dynamics of the Arctic
region range from potential disputes to international collabo-
ration. Some researchers warn about impending conflicts
while others emphasise the region's unique cooperative envi-
ronment (Østhagen, 2017). For those concerned about the
adverse security consequences of climate change, collective
actions and regimes designed to limit carbon emissions are at
the core of global warming concerns which may not be
separated from the geostrategic dynamics. In this regard,
climate change, on the one hand, alters how interaction occurs
between socio-ecological units whereby existing modes of
interaction morph, for instance, the opening of new sea routes
in the Arctic reconfigures Arctic states and others (Corry
2020). On the other, it also influences socio-economic
change, which is a key dynamic driving the interest in
Arctic resources.
Since 2007 when the UNSC held its first official debate
on the possible security implications of climate change in
terms of international security, various representatives of
countries (especially from Russia, China and India) have
reemphasized the UNFCCC as the appropriate institution
with a legitimate mandate for progressing the climate se-
curity debate. Representatives from other countries dis-
agreed. They (for example, Germany, Sweden and Britain)
argued that the UNSC has the legitimacy to continue the
debate. The basic text of these competing postures is
whether it is appropriate to consider climate change a threat
to international peace and security and whether the UNSC is
an appropriate forum in which to consider climate change
(Bo 2016). Since the UNSC has even nodded to the suit-
ability of the UNFCCC (Scott 2015) in a move that may not
be separated from the competing postures, all this formed a
case in which the nuanced explanation regarding how it may
eventuate is worth more exploration in future research. This
would only reveal the developments on the surface. By
engaging with these developments at a deeper level, a
comparative examination of the UNFCCC, the EU, and the
UNSC will likely uncover relevant interchanges.
5. Conclusions
Having proposed and discussed climate security: a research
agenda proposal with certain research significance primarily
because most existing research on this topic has been some-
what quiet when it comes to comparative analysis regarding
how the UNFCCC, the EU, and the UNSC have understood
and conceptualized climate security, this study urges re-
searchers to prioritize this agenda. Set against this back-
ground, it is argued that conceptual development persists even
though these institutions original mandates did not require
such conceptualization. Speech-acts on climate security, taken
together, now seem like a potential policy consideration in the
foreseeable future. As the academia and policy spheres
grapple with these challenges, disagreement continues over
whether climate change has been securitized. Speech-acts bythe three institutional case studies provide opportunity to ac-
quire knowledge about norm development and climate secu-
ritization. This is especially so given distinctive but different
conceptualizations of climate security by these influential
institutions.
As much remains to be learned about climate security
challenges, the proposed research agenda also directs our
attention to two important features of international politics
namely norm entrepreneurship and securitization. These two
cross-cutting features require attention if we are to progress the
climate security debate. Dedicated attention to norm entrepre-
neurship and securitization will reveal several aspects of these
features as conspicuously related such that specific aspects
implies or complements the other. For instance, full securiti-
zation of climate change is attainable when norm entrepreneurs
are able to convince relevant audience to fully accept either the
framing of climate change as a security issue or that climate
change is a real threat to human well-being. More pointedly, as
climate security is still in the first stage of norm's life cycle,
opportunities exist to make real contributions to research on
securitization. Whether or not climate security will mature into
an international norm rests on successful norm entrepreneurship
or full securitization of climate change.
For researchers who might be interested in advancing the
research agenda introduced in this study, it is important to
highlight here the key element of a set of fundamental di-
vergences between norm entrepreneurship and securitiza-
tion. This particular element arises from the type of
analytical unit adopted for conceptualising the literature and
thereafter its application to each case study. Asking the right
questions is essential to detecting security framings in
speech-acts. Therefore, taking varied analytical units into
consideration, the research question might then become why,
considering the emergence of epistemic communities on
climate security, are actors conversing in certain tones and
not another. Conclusively, researchers are encouraged to
reflect on the reasons for uneven responses to climate se-
curity challenges.
Declaration of competing interest
The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgement
This study contains some information from the author's
ongoing PhD project. The author would like to thank his su-
pervisors Prof. James Goodman and Dr. Lai-Ha Chan for their
guidance. This work was supported by the Australian Gov-
ernment Research Training Program Scholarship. The author
would like to thank the editors and anonymous peer reviewers
for their helpful comments.
References
Baldwin, A., Fr€ohlich, C., Rothe, D., 2019. From climate migration to
Anthropocene mobilities: shifting the debate. Mobilities 14 (3), 289e297.
451ODEYEMI C. / Advances in Climate Change Research 11 (2020) 442e452Balzacq, T., 2011. A theory of securitization: origins, core assumptions and
variants. In: Balzacq, T. (Ed.), Securitization Theory: How Security
Problems Emerge and Dissolve. Routledge, New York, pp. 1e29.
Biedenkopf, K., Petri, F., 2019. EU delegations in European Union climate
diplomacy: the role of links to Brussels, individuals and country contexts.
J. Eur. Integrat. 41 (1), 47e63.
Bo, Y., 2016. Securitization and Chinese climate change policy. Chinese Po-
litical Science Review 1 (1), 94e112.
Boston, J., Nel, P., Righarts, M., et al., 2009. Climate change and security:
planning for the future. Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington.
Bremberg, N., 2018. European regional organizations and climate-related se-
curity risks.
Bremberg, N., Sonnsj€o, H., Mobj€ork, M., 2019. The EU and climate-related
security risks: a community of practice in the making? J. Eur. Integrat.
41 (5), 623e639.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., de Wilde, J., 1998. Security: a new framework for
analysis. Lynne Rienner, Boulder.
Calliari, E., Surminski, S., Mysiak, J., 2019. The politics of (and behind) the
UNFCCC's loss and damage mechanism. In: Mechler, R., Bouwer, L.,
Schinko, T., Surminski, S., Linnerooth-Bayer, J. (Eds.), Loss and Damage
from Climate Change: Climate Risk Management, Policy and Governance.
Springer, Cham.
Carlane, C.P., 2010. Climate Change Law and Policy: EU and US Approaches.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Chin-Yee, S., 2019. Climate change and human security: case studies linking
vulnerable populations to increased security risks in the face of the global
climate challenge. The European Centre for Energy and Resource Security
e Strategy. Paper No. 18, pp. 1-33.
Christiansen, S.M., 2016. Climate Conflicts: A Case of International Environ-
mental and Humanitarian Law. Springer International Publishing, Basel.
Conca, K., 2015. An Unfinished Foundation: the United Nations and Global
Environmental Governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Conca, K., 2019. Is there a role for the UN Security Council on climate
change? Environment 61 (1), 4e15.
Conway, D., 2010. The United Nations Security Council and climate change:
challenges and opportunities. Clim. Law 1 (3), 378e407.
Corry, O., 2012. Securitization and ‘riskification’: second-order security and
the politics of climate change. Millenn. J. Int. Stud. 40 (2), 235e258.
Corry, O., 2020. Nature and the international: towards a materialist under-
standing of societal multiplicity. Globalizations 17 (3), 419e435.
Cousins, S., 2013. UN Security Council: playing a role in the international
climate change regime? Global Change Peace Secur. 25 (2), 191e210.
Cross, M.K.D., 2013. Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later.
Rev. Int. Stud. 39 (1), 137e160.
Dabelko, G.D., Simmons, P.J., 1997. Environmental and security: core ideas
and U.S. government initiatives. SAIS Review of International Affairs 17
(1), 127e146.
Dellmuth, L.M., 2019. Intergovernmental organisations and climate risks. Euro-
pean Centre for Development PolicyManagement Great Insights 8 (4), 9e11.
Dellmuth, L.M., Gustafsson, M.-T., Bremberg, N., et al., 2017. IGOs and
global climate security challenges: implications for academic research and
policymaking. SIPRI. Fact Sheet December, pp. 1-4.
Dellmuth, L.M., Gustafsson, M.-T., Bremberg, N., et al., 2018. Intergovern-
mental organizations and climate security: advancing the research agenda.
WIREs Climate Change 9 (e496), 1e13.
Depledge, D., Feakin, T., 2012. Climate change and international institutions:
implications for security. Clim. Pol. 12 (1), S73eS84.
Detraz, N., Betsill, M., 2009. Climate change and environmental security: for
whom the discourse shifts. Int. Stud. Perspect. 10 (2), 303e320.
Diez, T., von Lucke, F., Wellmann, Z., 2016. The Securitisation of Climate
Change: Actors, Processes and Consequences. Routledge, New York.
Dupont, C., 2019. The EU's collective securitisation of climate change. W. Eur.
Polit. 42 (2), 369e390.
EU (European Union), 2016. Shared vision, common action: a stronger
Europe: a global strategy for the European Union's foreign and security
policy. https://tinyurl.com/y9jtlvso.
Evans, G., 2008. Conflict potential in a world of climate Change. Bucerius
Summer School on Global Governance, Hamburg.Ewing, J.J., 2014. Climate security and the united Nations: views from the east
and the west. In: Hofmeister, H., Rueppel, P. (Eds.), Climate Change Di-
plomacy: The Way Forward for Asia and Europe. Konrad-Adenauer Sti-
fung and European Union, Singapore and Brussels, pp. 153e166.
Femia, F., Sternberg, T., Werrell, C.E., 2014. Climate hazards, security, and the
uprisings in Syria and Egypt. Seton Hall J. Diplom. Int. Relat. 16 (1), 71e84.
Ferguson, P., 2019. Discourses of resilience in the climate security debate.
Global Environ. Polit. 19 (2), 104e126.
Floyd, R., 2019a. Collective securitisation in the EU: normative dimensions.
W. Eur. Polit. 42 (2), 391e412.
Floyd, R., 2019b. The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Frick, M., Schulz, S., 2014. Climate change politics and policies: Germany
and the European Union in the climate negotiations. In: Hofmeister, H.,
Rueppel, P. (Eds.), Climate Change Diplomacy: The Way Forward for Asia
and Europe. Konrad-Adenauer Stifung and European Union, Singapore
and Brussels, pp. 37e52.
Germond, B., Mazaris, A.D., 2019. Climate change and maritime security.
Mar. Pol. 99, 262e266.
Germond, B., Wa Ha, F., 2019. Climate change and maritime security narra-
tive: the case of the International Maritime Organization. J. Environ. Soc.
Sci. 9 (1), 1e12.
Goldstein, J.S., 2016. Climate change as a global security issue. J. Global Sec.
Stud. 1 (1), 95e98.
Hardt, J.N., 2017. Environmental Security in the Anthropocene: Assessing
Theory and Practice. Routledge, New York.
Harris, D.W., 2019. Intention and commitment in speech acts. Theor. Ling. 45
(1), 53e67.
Herrmann, V., 2017. Arctic Indigenous societal security at COP21: the
divergence of security discourse and instruments in climate negotiations.
Politik 3 (20), 65e82.
Hossain, K., 2016. Securitizing the Arctic indigenous peoples: a community
security perspective with special reference to the Sami of the European
high north. Polar Science 10 (3), 415e424.
Hsiang, M., Burke, M., 2013. Climate, conflict, and social stability: what does
the evidence say? Climatic Change 123 (1), 39e55.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014. AR5 Climate
Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. https://tinyurl.com/zj4ttao.
(Accessed 26 November 2020).
Jerden, B., 2017. Security expertise and international hierarchy: the case of
‘The Asia-Pacific Epistemic Community’. Rev. Int. Stud. 43 (3), 494e515.
Kalkavan, B., 2019. The when and how of climate conflict: the case of Mali.
European Centre for Development Policy Management Great Insights 8
(4), 9e11.
Keohane, R.O., 2016. Post-Paris: pledge and review and politics research.
Berlin Conference on Global Environmental Change e Transformative
Global Climate Governance Apres Paris, Berlin.
Klinsky, S., Roberts, T., Huq, S., et al., 2017. Why equity is fundamental in
climate change policy research. Global Environ. Change 44, 170e173.
Krampe, F., Mobj€ork, M., 2018. Responding to climate-related security risks:
reviewing regional organizations in Asia and Africa. Current Climate
Change Reports 4 (4), 330e337.
Kurtz, G., 2012. Securitization of climate change in the united Nations 2007 e
2010. In: Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Brauch, H.-G., et al. (Eds.), Climate
Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal
Stability. Springer, Berlin, pp. 669e684.
McDonald, M., 2013. Discourses of climate security. Polit. Geogr. 33 (1),
42e51.
McDonald, M., 2020. Climate Change, Security, and the Australian Bushfires,
vol. 12. Lowy Institute’s The Interpreter. https://tinyurl.com/y6yf3un2.
Meierding, E., 2013. Climate change and conflict: avoiding small talk about
the weather. Int. Stud. Rev. 15 (2), 185e203.
Meierding, E., 2016. Disconnecting climate change from conflict: a method-
ological proposal. In: O'Lear, S., Dalby, S. (Eds.), Reframing Climate
Change: Constructing Ecological Geopolitics. Routledge, New York,
pp. 52e66.
Mitchell, R.B., Carpenter, C., 2019. Norms for the earth: changing the climate
on ‘climate change’. J. Global Sec. Stud. 4 (4), 413e429.
452 ODEYEMI C. / Advances in Climate Change Research 11 (2020) 442e452Nevitt, M.P., 2020. On environmental, climate change & national security law.
Harv. Environ. Law Rev. 44. https://tinyurl.com/usnvhba.
Nishimura, L.S., 2017. Responding to climate change and migration: adap-
tation and state obligations. School of Advanced Study, University of
London. Refugee Law Initiative Working Paper No. 25.
O'Brien, K., Barnett, J., 2013. Global environmental change and human se-
curity. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 38, 373e391.
Oels, A., 2012. From ‘securitization’ of climate change to ‘climatization’ of
the security field: comparing three theoretical perspectives. In:
Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Brauch, H.-G., et al. (Eds.), Climate Change,
Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability.
Springer, Berlin, pp. 185e205.
Okpara, U.T., Stringer, L.C., Dougill, A.J., 2017. Using a novel climate-water
conflict vulnerability index to capture double exposures in Lake Chad.
Reg. Environ. Change 17 (2), 351e366.
Østhagen, A., 2017. Geopolitics and security in the Arctic: what role for the
EU? European View 16 (2), 239e249.
Paglia, E., 2018. The socio-scientific construction of global climate crisis.
Geopolitics 23 (1), 96e123.
Pearson, D., Newman, P., 2019. Climate security and a vulnerability model for
conflict prevention: a systematic literature review focusing on African
agriculture. Sustainable Earth 2 (2), 1e22.
Pettenger, M., 2017. Framing global climate security. In: Burke, A., Parker, R.
(Eds.), Global Insecurity: Futures of Global Chaos and Governance. Pal-
grave Macmillan, London, pp. 119e137.
Schilling, J., Hertig, E., Tramblay, Y., et al., 2020. Climate change vulnera-
bility, water resources and social implications in North Africa. Reg. En-
viron. Change 20 (1), 1e13.
Scott, S.V., 2015. Implications of climate change for the UN Security Council:
mapping the range of potential policy responses. Int. Aff. 91 (6),
1317e1333.
Sindico, F., 2007. Climate change: a security (council) issue? Carbon and
Climate Law Review 1 (1), 26e31.
SoK (State of Kuwait), 2018. Concept note: arria-formula on the protection of
environment during armed conflict, vol. 7. https://tinyurl.com/yymrafuc.
Solow, A.R., 2013. Global warming: a call for peace on climate and conflict.
Nature 497, 179e180.
Sonnsj€o, H., Bremberg, N., 2016. Climate Change in an EU Security Context:
the Role of the European External Action Service. AJ E-Print AB,
Stockholm.Sperling, J., Webber, M., 2017. NATO and the Ukraine crisis: collective
securitization. Eur. J. Int. Sec. 2 (1), 19e46.
Sperling, J., Webber, M., 2019. The European Union: security governance and
collective securitization. W. Eur. Polit. 42 (2), 228e260.
Stritzel, H., 2007. Towards a theory of securitization: copenhagen and beyond.
Eur. J. Int. Relat. 13 (3), 353e383.
Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., Squatrito, T., et al., 2016. The performance of
international organizations: a policy output approach. J. Eur. Publ. Pol. 23
(7), 1077e1096.
Thomas, M.D., 2017. The Securitization of Climate Change: Australian and
United States' Military Responses (2003e2013). Springer International
Publishing, Basel.
Trombetta, M.J., 2012. Climate change and the environmental conflict
Discourse. In: Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Brauch, H.-G., et al. (Eds.),
Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for
Societal Stability. Springer, Berlin, pp. 151e164.
van der Geest, K., Warner, K., 2015. Editorial: loss and damage from climate
change: emerging perspectives. Int. J. Glob. Warming 8 (2), 133e140.
Verhoeven, H., 2014. Gardens of Eden or hearts of darkness? The genealogy of
discourses on environmental insecurity and climate wars in Africa.
Geopolitics 19 (4), 784e805.
Vivekananda, J., 2018. Climate change, conflict and crisis in Lake Chad.
European Security and Defence Union 30, 23e26.
Vivekananda, J., Schilling, J., Smith, D., 2014. Climate resilience in fragile
and conflict-affected societies: concepts and approaches. Dev. Pract. 24
(4), 487e501.
von Lucke, F., 2014. Counter securitization or slippery slope: the political
implications of different climate security discourses. Annual Meeting of
the International Studies Association, Toronto.
von Lucke, F., 2015. The attempted securitisation of climate change in
Mexico: explorations into actors, processes and consequences. University
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